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U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War 
Lubna Sunawar1, Tatiana Coutto2 
 
Introduction  
Since the end of British India’s colonial rule in 1947 and the subsequent partition of the South 
Asian subcontinent, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been driven largely by geopolitical and ideological 
concerns. Located at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia, and relatively close to the 
Soviet Union (USSR) and Europe, Pakistan emerged not only as a potential bridge between the oil-
rich Persian Gulf, energy-hungry East Asia, and the West3, but also as a channel to ‘the Muslim 
World’. Such potential, however, has never been fulfilled: unsettled territorial disputes with India, 
along with irreconcilable national identity claims, weak intra-regional trade and fragile democratic 
structures have all prevented Pakistan from escaping the security dilemma it has faced since its 
inception.  
 
The role of the U.S. in Pakistan’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War, the ‘war against the 
USSR’ in Afghanistan – regarded as the first test case for Pakistan during the Cold war as a frontline 
ally of the U.S - and, currently, the fight against terrorism should not be understated. Nevertheless, 
Pakistan-U.S. relations have been described as ‘a tale of exaggerated expectations, broken promises, 
and disastrous misunderstandings’.4 In this love-hate relationship, attempts to establish cordial ties and 
periods of economic and military assistance and cooperation have been interspersed with phases 
characterized by friction and mutual distrust. As stated by Haqqani, U.S. motivations for seeking an 
alliance with Pakistan have been different from Islamabad’s reasons for accepting it. As a 
consequence, Pakistan has been repeatedly disappointed that the U.S. does not share its fears of Indian 
hegemony on the subcontinent, while Washington has been expecting further engagement from 
Pakistan in the fight against Communism and terrorism, rather than diverting economic and military 
assistance to address India’s hard power capabilities.5 
 
Following the partition of the subcontinent, the Truman administration adopted a somewhat 
conflicting strategy to build ‘the most constructive possible bilateral relationship’ with both India and 
Pakistan. Assuming that the region would remain under British influence, Washington hoped that the 
newly-born states would be interdependent, stable (formally or informally), aligned with the West, and 
resistant to domestic and external Communist threats.6 U.S. enthusiasm for India, however, was 
curtailed by Jawaharlal Nehru’s politics of non-alignment, while Pakistan was seen by Washington 
analysts as a ‘potential valuable strategic asset’ that Americans could not afford to alienate.7 Rather 
than an alliance based on shared values, interactions between the two countries were largely driven by 
Pakistan’s need to counter-balance India, combined with strong U.S. will to contain Soviet influence. 
 
This paper seeks to analyze the determinants of Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy during the 
Cold War. From Pakistanis’ leaders standpoint, what were the country’s geopolitical options and 
bargaining tools during that period? While Pakistan’s preferences remained stable throughout that 
period, its foreign policy strategies were constrained by the regional and global geopolitical context, as 
                                                
1*Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS), National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. 
2 *American Graduate School in Paris (AGS) 
3H.C. Arya, “A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations of the U.S. with Pakistan,”(Ph.D Thesis), Indian School of International Studies. New Delhi, 
1966, p. 2 
4Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, New York: Public Affairs, 2013, p.6. 
5 Id, p.3 
6Robert J. McMahon. The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.  
7 Id, p. 37. 
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well as by internal power struggles. This article does not reject structural realists’ analyses of South 
Asian geopolitics; rather, we take it as a point of departure to explore the mechanisms and processes 
that have shaped Pakistan’s international behavior by following a historical approach based on both 
Western and Pakistani sources. 
 
South Asia and the Hobbesian image of international relations 
Persistent security dilemmas, nuclear issues, and ethnical and religious differences limit the 
possibilities for stable peace in South Asia and reinforce the Hobbesian image of international 
relations in the region. From the academic standpoint, a large body of research has drawn on 
Structural Realism to explain the connection between the involvement of Cold War superpowers in 
South Asia and the enduring struggle for power in the region.8 With the development of International 
Relations as a field of study, other approaches have allowed for a greater understanding of the region’s 
security issues. By opening the black-box of states’ preferences, the English school has shed light on 
the impact of superpowers’ support for certain political groups in the region (through arms transfers, 
for example).9 Constructivists have focused on how beliefs and knowledge have influenced states’ 
preferences, shaped religious-nationalist ideologies and accounted for the formation of national 
identities, thereby establishing boundaries between ‘US’ and ‘the Others’.10 A broader 
conceptualization of security threats and a focus on the regional level have also allowed for a better 
understanding of the enjeux and the patterns of amity and enmity within the South Asian ‘security 
complex’.11 
 
Structural Realism posits that the behavior of sovereign states can be explained by constraints 
imposed by the anarchic structure of the international system on the pursuit of their national interest.12 
In the absence of a central government capable of enforcing rules of behavior, power (and not 
morality) is the central arbiter of international relations.13 Caught in a dilemma inherent to the 
structure of the international system, states must adopt foreign policy strategies that increase their 
security and ensure their survival. Neorealism associates this quest for security with the increment of 
power attributes such as regional hegemony, wealth, and nuclear/technological capacity.14 The end of 
the Cold War and the development of information technologies have led to a more interdependent 
world where states no longer have the monopoly of the foreign policy agenda: one has witnessed an 
increasing participation of private actors, in addition to the development of a complex multilevel 
governance architecture.15 Notwithstanding the emergence of a liberal view of international politics, 
the traditional security-driven logic of self-help that shapes the interactions among nation states still 
prevails.16 In line with rationalist approaches to IR (Structural Realism included), this article draws on 
the assumption that states are rational actors, and that national preferences remained stable during that 
period of time. Pakistan’s preferences included: a) survival of the state and the impossibility of 
                                                
8Mohammed Ayoob, “India, Pakistan and Superpower Rivalry”. The World Today, Vol. 38, No 5 (May 1982), pp. 194-202. For a comprehensive review 
of the underlying factors and dynamics of India-Pakistan relations, see: T.V. Paul (ed.), The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
9 See, for example, Gregory S. Sanjian, ‘Cold War Imperatives and Quarrelsome Clients: Modelling U.S. and USSR Arms Transfers to India and 
Pakistan’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 97-127. 
10 Jutta Weldes (ed.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
11 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies  
in the Post Cold War Era. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991.  Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Power: The Structure of International 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
12 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979.  
13Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986, p. 304. 
14 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . New York:W.W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
15Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence. Boston: Longman, 4th ed., 2012. 
16Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, No 1, 2000, pp.5-41. 
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reunification with India, and b) an improvement of its status vis-à-vis the US, as Pakistan emerged as 
‘the Eastern bastion against Communism’, with Turkey the Western bastion. Assuming that these 
interests remain stable, however, does not exclude variation in terms of foreign policy behavior, as 
preferences are constrained by domestic and external factors. In order to analyze the different 
strategies adopted by Pakistan to promote its security, it is necessary to look at the interplay between 
national, regional and global factors that have shaped the calculations and threat perceptions of 
Pakistani leaders over time. The basis of the article is the Cold War period. Data stems from both 
Western and South Asian sources, as well as press records and interviews with academics and 
Pakistani foreign policy practitioners carried out in France in 2013. 
 
Pakistan’s security concerns during the Cold War 
Established in August 1947 in Karachi, the Pakistani government immediately faced an enormous 
challenge: to ensure its survival and cope with the power asymmetries in the region while lacking 
‘resources, files, equipment or any of the necessities required to operate’.17 This need for economic 
assistance compelled Pakistan to reach out to the United States, which was then trying to curb Soviet 
influence by promoting a strategic alliance of Asian states.18 The U.S. strengthened Pakistan’s military 
profile and provided aid for development, but at the same time encouraged undemocratic and 
conservative tendencies in the country, including Islamists. At the time, Pakistan’s religious profile 
was of little concern; in fact, it suited Washington’s interests in the region as the religion itself became 
a powerful element of a nascent national identity and internal stability, and a defense against 
Communism.19 
 
In the years that followed its emergence as an independent state, Pakistan faced a number of 
security challenges, including a huge influx of Muslim refugees from India, weak economic structures 
inherited from the British Raj, a lack of administrative capacity and, most importantly of all, the 
possibility of Indian hegemony in the region. In order to tackle these problems, Pakistan first explored 
the possibility of receiving relief from the British Commonwealth. This option, however, was not 
feasible due to the latter’s poor economic condition after the Second World War and its clear tilt 
towards India.20 
 
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, was an Oxford-educated supporter of 
parliamentarism, albeit sympathetic to the non-aligned movement (NAM). These elements explain his 
attempt to pursue a neutral foreign policy, rather than aligning with either of the superpowers,21 while 
India rebuffed any formal alliance with the West. The possibility of providing access to warm waters 
may have motivated the Soviets to approach Pakistan in the years following independence,22 thereby 
expanding the influence, authority and economic supremacy of the USSR in the region. Moscow’s 
pro-India attitude, the general incompatibility between Islam and Communism, and weak diplomatic 
channels – Pakistan did not have an embassy at Moscow impeded the concretization of a visit to the 
USSR. This episode has been described as a ‘grave diplomatic blunder by Pakistan from every 
perspective,’ as Pakistan’s regional role would have been better appreciated by America and the 
                                                
17 Interview with David Newson, Information Officer, USIS, Karachi (1947-1950). Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History Establishing Ties with Pakistan -
1947.Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.Available at http://adst.org/2013/10/establishing-ties-with-pakistan-1947/ Accessed 17 May 2014. 
18 Melvin Leffler, A preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press,1992.  
19Touqir Hussain, “The US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,”United States Institute of Peace, (Autumn 2005): p. 2. 
20MassarratSohail, PartitionandAngloPakistanRelations, 1947-1951, (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 199) pp. 37-55 
21Pakistan Times, 10 March 1951. PM Liaquat’s speech 
22Opcit. 
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Russian attitude could have been more conciliatory towards Pakistan.23 Eventually Khrushchev would 
openly support India in the United Nations (UN), by vetoing all resolutions on Kashmir favorable to 
Pakistan, while Delhi refused to vote for a resolution regarding USSR intervention in Hungary in 
1956.24 
 
Following a formal invitation from Washington, Liaquat visited the U.S. in 1950. His efforts to 
persuade the U.S. to take the initiative in solving the Kashmir dispute did not bear fruit, as the U.S. 
was more interested in containing Soviet influence in the region25 by using the Karachi-Lahore area of 
Pakistan as a base for air operations against the USSR and a staging area for forces engaged in the 
defense or recapture of Middle Eastern oil areas.26 Global geopolitical considerations allowed Pakistan 
to receive aid from the U.S., free from obligation such as joining US-led security pacts to encumber 
China, for example.27 In the 1950s Pakistan became ‘America’s most allied ally’ when it came to 
containing Soviet expansion.28 
 
Regional geopolitical factors also played a crucial role in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Bordering 
the USSR, the People’s Republic of China (with whom diplomatic ties were established in 1951), and 
India, there seemed to be "no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of 
having three such mighty neighbors"29. Pakistan’s geography until 1971 was unique: comprised of two 
sections, West and East (now Bangladesh), separated by one thousand miles of Indian Territory which 
eventually played its part in the war of 1971. This ‘truncated power asymmetry’ led Pakistan to spend 
more on defense than any other developing country, and to systematically turn to the U.S. as a means 
to increase its hard power capabilities.30 
 
The most allied ally’: military co-operation with the U.S.  
In May 1954, Pakistan and the U.S. signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which was 
followed by Pakistan becoming a member of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), an 
alliance sponsored by the U.S. The calculated objective of signing this treaty was the containment of 
Communism. On the other hand, there was no guarantee for Pakistan of any collective action against 
non-communist attack on its soil, i.e. from India. Pakistan, left with no other viable option, started 
moving itself from a position of qualified neutrality to one of unqualified alliance with the West. 
 
The Pakistani elite, heavily influenced by the Western democratic system and drawn mainly 
from the feudal and military classes trained in Western education, was paramount to the establishment 
of an ever-closer alliance with the U.S.31 In 1955, political power in Pakistan was assumed by a "small 
group of British-trained administrators and military leaders centering around Governor-General 
Ghulam Mohammed and his principal associates, Generals Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan," who 
                                                
23Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics.Space Publishers; 3rd Edition, 1970.p. 107. 
24VojtechMastny, ‘The Soviet Union’s Partnership with India’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 12, No 3, Summer 2010, pp. 50-90. 
25Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia. London: Oxford Printing Press, 1951. pp. 15-16 
26 Robert J. McMahon, ‘United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan,1947-1954’. The Journal of 
American History, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1988. pp. 812-840. 
27Latif, ASherwani, (1967). India, China and Pakistan.Feroz Sons’Publishers, Karachi. p.65 
28 Robert G. Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,”Asian Affairs, an American Review, Summer 2003, p. 70. 
29Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 114. 
30 T.V. Paul, ‘Why has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been so Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict’.Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 
2006, pp. 600-630. 
31ShaheenIrshad, Rejection Alliances: A Case Study of US-Pak Relations (1947-1967) (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1972) p.28 
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favored a policy of economic development through austerity and foreign aid, and close alignment with 
the U.S.32 
In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, later known as the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO). Although firmly and officially on the Western side of the fence, the perception that the 
U.S. took Pakistan for granted began to grow among Pakistani officials.33 In 1959, a cooperation 
agreement was signed between the two states: the U.S. would be required to assist Pakistan if it 
became the victim of aggression from any other country (and particularly countries in the region).34 
Pakistan’s signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements, SEATO and CENTO, has been 
justified by its hostile relations with both India and Afghanistan, and the need to remediate extremely 
poor socio-economic conditions. The basic purpose of the Pakistani leadership in signing these 
defense pacts was quite obvious: to improve the country’s defense capability against India.35 Pakistan 
also wanted to develop positive and friendly relations with the Muslim world, andsigning CENTO 
provided Pakistan with an opportunity to become closer to Iran and Turkey. From the U.S. 
perspective, Pakistan’s new Middle Eastern focus offered the potential to promote American interests 
in the region.  
 
By 1957 the U.S. had provided substantial aid for the development of Pakistan’s infra-structure 
and agriculture, in addition to supplying a wide range of military hardware, including Patton tanks, 
artillery, helicopters, bombers, high-level long distance radars, frigates and a Ghazi submarine. The 
U.S. also supported the development of nuclear research infrastructure.36In return the U.S. gained 
extraterritorial rights, allowing it to set up a secret intelligence base under the guise of a 
‘communication center’ at Badaber, near Peshawar.37This also served as the base for high-level U-2 
‘spy in the sky’ surveillance aircraft for illegal flights over the Soviet Union. From the Bedaber base 
in Peshawar, the U.S. could follow the Soviet and Chinese activities.38 
 
Pakistan paid a heavy price for this alliance, as it began to be regarded as a ‘messenger of 
imperialist powers’ by Muslim countries, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.39 It also 
antagonized the two communist giants, the USSR and China. On the top of that, the alignment did not 
have a large amount of public support within Pakistan, for people feared that it would jeopardize their 
freedom and sovereignty in the years to come. Lastly, the pact would prove to be a fatal mistake, as it 
led to a stalemate on the Kashmir.40 In 1958, a coup d’état brought General Ayub Khan to power with 
U.S. support. Ayub would remain in office until his resignation in 1969, when he was succeeded by 
general Agha Yahya Khan. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, Washington (NIE 52-55), 15 March 1955. Available at http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-
57v08/reference/frus.frus195557v08.i0011.pdf Accessed 10 May 2014. 
33Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.132 
34Dawn, 31 January1957, cited by ShahidM.Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p.43  
35Sayeed, Khalid B., Politics in Pakistan The Nature and Direction of Change. New York: Praeger.p.269 
36Air Mar. Ayaz Ahmed Khan.Pak-U.S. in Historical Perspective.Available at Bhutto.org http://sixhour.com/pak-
us%20ties%20in%20historical%20perspective.htm Accessed 20 Mar 2014. 
37Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005, op. cit. p.49. 
38 Ibid. p.50  
39 Selig S. Harrison, “India, Pakistan and U.S: Case History of a Mistake, “New Republic, Vol. 141, Nos. 8-9, 10 August 1959 
40Surendra Chopra, “U.S. Intervention in the Indo-Pakistan Dialogue 1953-1955,”Kurukshetra University Research Journal, Vol. 4, Part 1-2, 1970, pp. 
165-176. 
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Implications of Sino-Pakistani relations 
By the early 1950s, U.S. analysts had a good understanding that "when Pakistanis talk about defense, 
they talk about defense against India,"41 which might have contributed to them taking their alliance 
with Pakistan for granted. Nevertheless, Pakistan was prepared to do anything to continue the supply 
of arms to counter Indian aggression, regardless of where they came from.42 
 
The fragile balance of power in the region would be disturbed once more with the outbreak of 
the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Following a steep increase in U.S. military and economic aid to India, 
Pakistan sided with China, heralding a new period in the relationship between the two countries, 
focused more on strengthening bilateral relations and common interests. For China, Pakistan was 
a "low-cost secondary deterrent to India,"43 but at the same time a key aspect of Beijing’s policy of 
isolating the latter’s regional rival.44 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, China provided Pakistan with arms, supported the development of a 
Pakistani arms industry and improved its nuclear weapons delivery systems. They also equipped the 
Pakistani army with both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shaheen missile 
series. Today, Pakistan’s air force and navy possess latest weapons coproduced with China. Pakistan’s 
Air Force includes Chinese interceptor and advanced trainer aircraft, as well as an Airborne Early 
Warning and Control radar system used to detect aircraft. Pakistan is producing the JF-17 Thunder 
multi-role combat aircraft jointly with China. The K-8 Karakorum light attack aircraft was also 
coproduced.45 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorated and did not transform into the long-
term, workable and sustainable strategic partnership that the U.S. had envisaged.46 The defense pacts 
were strongly questioned after the Second Kashmir War of 1965 when Pakistani leaders felt that the 
U.S. did not provide any significant assistance. Such a posture was perceived as ‘unfair and unethical’, 
and a serious hindrance to a workable and longstanding relationship with the U.S.47 Although 
Pakistan’s support from Muslim countries increased, the country became a target of U.S. sanctions 
during the 1965 War with India. While the U.S. cut the supply of military equipment and economic 
aid to Pakistan, the USSR continued providing India with military hardware and economic assistance 
to ensure Indian supremacy over Pakistan.48 Pakistani civilian and military authorities in particular 
were aware of the fact that they could not prescind from America, but eventually realized that it would 
not be in their interests to rely exclusively on Western countries for support. Following this pragmatic 
view, President Ayub decided not to break with the U.S.-led alliance, but at the same time to maintain 
a sustainable balance of cordiality with the other major powers as well.49 
 
                                                
41 Telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, Karachi, 30 March 1957. United States.Department of Sate / Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1955-1957. South Asia (1955-1957). Available at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS195557v08.i0011&id=FRUS.FRUS195557v08&isize=text Accessed 20 Mar 2014. 
42 Khalid B. Sayeed, “Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”in S.P. Verma and K.P. Misra, ed., Foreign Policies in South Asia, (Bombay, 
1969,) p. 73 and p.102. 
43 Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqan, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006. 
44Amal Afridi, and JayshreeBajoria, China-Pakistan Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 July 2010. Available at http://i.cfr.org/china/china-
pakistan-relations/p10070 Accessed 7 March 2014. 
45http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070/chinapakistan_relations.html 
46Robert G. Wersing, “Precarious Relationship: Pakistan’s Response to US Security Policies” Asian Affairs, (Autumn 2005): pp.65-70. 
47SafdarMehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, p. 200 
48 Ibid, p. 207 
49Sayeed, Khalid B., Politics in Pakistan The Nature and Direction of Change. New York: Praeger.pp. 103-105 
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The suspension of U.S. military aid to both India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 
1965 and 1971 was regarded as a ‘stab in the back’ and a major setback for Pakistan’s economy, while 
India was advantaged by military and economic aid from western powers other than the U.S. 
Moreover, Moscow fully supported India against Pakistan and fueled tensions over the Pushtoonistan 
issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the western front, thus trying to manipulate the situation in 
its own favor by deliberately taking advantage of strained relations between Pakistan and the U.S.50 
 
Pakistan also faced tensions in the domestic realm. Ayub’s resignation in 1969 opened an 
avenue for the arrival in power of the commander in chief of the Army, General Yahya Khan, who 
enforced martial law in the country. Despite these strict conditions, elections took place in 1970, 
allowing the People’s League (Awami League) to gain a political majority in East Pakistan. Yahya’s 
resistance to handing over power to the League fed independence claims in the province. In March 
1971, the Pakistani Army began ‘Operation Searchlight’ to curb Bengali nationalist movements by 
targeting intellectuals, political activists, Hindus and other minorities.51 Many Bengali policemen and 
soldiers mutinied and nationalists formed a guerrilla force, the MuktiBahini, with Indian and Soviet 
support. In December 1971, Bangladesh emerged as an independent state, and Yahya was forced to 
hand over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Foreign Minister and founder of the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP). 
 
The loss of East Pakistan greatly affected Pakistan-U.S. relations, as the latter acknowledged 
India as a major regional power. Despite the official call for stability in South Asia, it was presumed in 
Indian circles that the U.S. would not do anything to foster an artificial parity of military strength 
between Pakistan and India.52 The Indian nuclear explosions of 1974 led the U.S. to reconsider its 
1965 arms embargo against Pakistan. In February 1975, following the visit of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – 
then in his second term as Prime Minister (1973 – 1977)- to the U.S., the Nixon administration finally 
announced the end of its embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan and India.  
 
The American decision to supply arms to Pakistan was fiercely opposed and criticized by both 
India and Afghanistan, as well as by some U.S. Senators. This move would embitter Indo-U.S. 
relations and open the road for the Soviets to supply arms to India in order to reestablish equilibrium 
in the region.53 The Pakistan-U.S. relationship started to deteriorate once again in 1976, when the Ford 
administration exerted unprecedented pressure on Pakistan to abandon the negotiations concerning the 
purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. Through pulling its aid strings (something it did 
relatively often), it threatened to block the supply of A-7 bombers to Pakistan. In 1979 President 
Carter cancelled American aid to Pakistan, having successfully pressed France to break this nuclear 
deal, which happened in 1976.54  
 
From Bhutto’s perspective, the ‘unjustified [U.S.] policy of appeasing India’ led him to 
consider China as a potential ally, or at the very least a supplier of nuclear material and technology. 
Ideological differences were ignored for the sake of military improvement, leading to some degree of 
understanding and reconciliation on their most important issues.55In approaching China, Pakistan was 
                                                
50 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005, op.cit.p.57  
51Sarmila Bose. Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, 8 October 2005. 
52 D.C. Jha, “U.S. Policy Towards India,”Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1, Jan-March 1976, pp. 67-71. 
53Indian Nation, 3 March, 1975. 
54 A.Q. Khan, Chairman, Khan Research Laboratories, ‘The Journey to our Tests,’ The News, Islamabad,  
  Special Issue, 28 May 1999. 
55Ibid. 
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attempting to disturb the regional balance of power by mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. Becoming a 
nuclear power remained a tantalizing possibility, as this capability would strongly deter India.56 By 
1976 a nuclear deal had been signed by Bhutto and Mao Zedong, which provided Pakistan with 
assistance for a civilian nuclear energy program, possibly the design of a nuclear weapon, and 50 
kilograms of highly enriched uranium.57 This meeting (as well as subsequent visits from Chinese 
nuclear authorities after Mao’s death) increased U.S. attention towards Pakistan, which translated into 
several meetings between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Bhutto. 
 
Two key international developments occurred subsequently that persuaded the U.S. to revise 
its policy towards Pakistan: the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979. In need of a strong foothold in the region, Washington turned once more to 
supporting and co-operating with its one-time ally. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald 
Reagan openly called for the establishment of military bases in Pakistan. Islamabad, by contrast, was 
determined not to provide any such facilities to the U.S. at the expense of its own national interests, 
which it believed had been compromised in 1965 and 1971.58 
 
Pakistan’s president at the time, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978-1988), had given a 
clear impression that he would support the toppling of the Shah of Iran to advance American interests 
in the region. Zia’s foreign policy strategy seemed prima facie contradictory: despite his goals of 
strengthening Pakistan’s image as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world, he was the first 
Pakistani ruler to adopt a hostile (albeit ambiguous) attitude towards Iran, while also criticizing the 
U.S. for not coming to the rescue of the pro-western Shah of Iran.   
 
Zia’s military regime repeatedly expressed concern over the increasing Soviet activity in 
Kabul, and called for U.S. action. Pakistan’s foreign affairs advisor, Agha Shahi declared that the 
Afghan crisis had profoundly affected Pakistan, and that the historical role of Afghanistan as a buffer 
zone had disappeared. Pakistan found itself ill-prepared and ill-equipped to contain the military threat 
on its north-western border. The Pakistani advisor explicitly told the Americans that the time to do 
something to counter the Soviet advancement in Afghanistan was now.59This warning was not taken 
seriously by the U.S. administration, however, until the presence of Russian tanks and soldiers in the 
country became a reality. 
 
Zia’s management of relations with Afghanistan was not viewed in a positive light by all in 
Pakistan’s political circles. Benazir Bhutto (at the time a promising and charismatic leader of the PPP) 
had been critical of President Zia’s policy towards Afghanistan and of his diplomatic gains during 
these years from the valuable U.S. economic and military assistance he had secured. According to 
Pakistani foreign policy practitioners and military officials, her arrival to power in 1988 was followed 
by immense pressure from the U.S. (and the Indian lobby) over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Her visit 
to the U.S. in 1989 aimed to convey the message that Pakistan neither had a bomb, nor had it any 
intentions of manufacturing one. On the other hand, she also asserted that Pakistan, being a sovereign 
nation, had the right to pursue its nuclear program for defense purposes. The U.S. showed some 
interest in maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
                                                
56 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan - U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust and its Deficit”, Pakistan Vision Vol. 12 No. 1, 2011.  
57 U.S. recently declassified documents state that there was ‘unambiguous evidence’ that Pakistan was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program and 
developing uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Source: National Security Archives, The Pakistani Nuclear Program’, 
secret/noforn/orcon.Available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf  Accessed 19 May 2014. 
58The Washington Post, 3 December 1981. 
59Agha Shahi’s statement, Dawn, October 30, 1979. 
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1988/89, offering to sell the country thirty-eight F-16 fighter jets and attempting to gain U.S. 
Congressional approval to provide Islamabad with $380 million in economic aid and $240 million in 
military aid.60 Nevertheless, Washington remained doubtful about the true ‘peacefulness’ of Pakistan’s 
nuclear program, which was considered a threat to regional stability.61 In 1991, following the 
dissolution of the USSR, Pakistan’s strategic value to U.S. analysts was significantly reduced, and 
U.S. political and financial support followed suit. The 1990s would represent a turning point in the 
relations between the sole remaining superpower and a weakened Pakistan. This context would not 
change until after 9/11, when Pakistan became once more a frontline state and a pivotal actor in 
George Bush’s war on terror.  
   
Institutional Issues 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen 
months after the establishment of Pakistan as a nation. His demise set in motion the political trends in 
the country that undermined the already weak political institutions and fragmented the political 
process. Most post-Jinnah political leaders had regional and local stature but were not capable of 
impressing the superpowers. This made it difficult for the political parties and leaders to pursue a 
consistent approach towards the problems and issues of the early years, which needed professional and 
administrative experience to tackle. They were unable to develop consensus on many important 
domestic and international issues which resulted in an eight-year delay in drafting a Constitution. By 
the time the Constitution was finally introduced, in1956, a strong tradition of the violation of 
parliamentary norms was established, thus making the government in power essentially helpless, the 
political parties divided and the assembly unable to assert its supremacy.  
 
The political system of Pakistan has since been characterized by repeated interruptions of the 
constitutional order coupled with the establishment of weak and non-viable political institutions and 
the rapid expansion of the role of the British-trained military bureaucratic elite in the political process. 
Such an authoritarian and opaque system severely constrains civilian control of the military forces.  
 
The failure to institutionalize good governance in Pakistan has caused much alienation at the 
national level. A good number of experienced and competent people feel that they are irrelevant to 
power management at the federal and provincial levels. Immersed in their own power games, 
Pakistani rulers do not prioritize the welfare of the common people, who carry the burden of the 
country’s Hobbesian foreign policy. These negative perceptions have led to an overall decline in the 
voting percentage in the general elections. Nevertheless, a more detailed observation of Pakistani 
society shows that, despite the lack of trust in politics and politicians (civilian and military), people 
continue to call for democracy, participatory governance and accountability. 
 
Institutional disparity  
 Pakistan inherited an institutional imbalance at the time of independence in August 1947, with 
the process of political decomposition and deterioration being set in motion soon after independence. 
The Muslim League that led the independence movement lacked sufficient organization, leadership, 
and capacity for state- and nation-building after the death of “the father of the nation” Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah in 1948. A number of Muslim League leaders had come from feudal or semi-feudal 
backgrounds, and were motivated by personal ambitions rather than any desire to build or strengthen 
the party as a workable organization capable of standing on its own feet. They were unable to offer 
                                                
60The Washington Post, June 7, 1989 
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any effective alternative solutions to the enormous security and developmental challenges faced by 
Pakistan. 
 
 Secondly, the lack of economic and institutional resources in the early years of independence 
led the civilian government to turn to the armed forces, not only for security but also for 
administrative support. Security problems with India, especially the First Kashmir War in 1948, also 
helped strengthen the military’s position. Dependence on the armed forces is clearly reflected in the 
country’s large military spending.62 The military’s position within the country’s political system 
received an additional boost with Pakistan’s participation in the U.S.-sponsored military alliances in 
the mid-1950s. These agreements facilitated weapon transfers to Pakistan and the American training 
of the Pakistani military, which increased the military’s overall competence and ability to strike their 
enemies.  
 
Conclusion 
 From the Pakistani military’s perspective, the legacy of the country’s relations with the U.S. 
during the Cold War has been negative. A sense of bitterness and mistrust towards the United States 
pervades Pakistani society and a large part of the population believes that their country has been 
unfairly treated, despite declaring itself a close U.S. ally in South Asia. Three main complaints were 
repeatedly pointed out: first, Washington’s refusal to help Pakistan during the 1965 war with India 
when it desperately needed assistance against its stronger enemy; second, the United States’ 
discarding of Pakistan when it was no longer needed after the Afghan war to promote U.S. agenda in 
the region; and, third, the sometimes discriminatory nature of U.S. nuclear sanctions, which have had 
a strongly negative impact on Pakistan’s economy and were targeted towards Pakistan only and did 
not affect India. 
 
 Geo-strategic considerations remain central to the US-Pakistan relationship. Interviews with 
diplomats and military officials show that, from the Pakistani standpoint, the U.S. sought to 
subordinate Pakistan rather than propose a foreign policy that could engender mutual gains and foster 
understanding. As in the Cold War, India remains the most valuable diplomatic prize of the region, 
which reduces Pakistan’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the U.S. This is a bitter reality and both the U.S. 
and Pakistan have been part of the problem and part of the solution simultaneously. 
 
Despite Pakistan's respect for U.S. security sensitivities in the region, the latter was not 
prepared to extend enough diplomatic support to Pakistan in its problems with India. It claimed its 
fight was primarily against Communism and India was not a Communist nation; moreover the United 
States did not want to provoke India at the cost of Pakistan, whom it believed to be a country highly 
strategic in the containing of Chinese influence. This raised doubts in Pakistan about the credibility of 
American support in the wake of the signing of defense pacts between the two nations. If Pakistanis 
were skeptical of American commitment to provide defense to Pakistan against India, questions were 
raised in the United States in late 1950s about the prudence of relying on Pakistan as a defender of 
American interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. However, the two sides downplayed their outstanding 
differences and continued to cooperate with each other for different reasons. 
 
It is worth mentioning that some groups of Western-educated top-brass in the Pakistani 
military made a significant contribution towards building the Pakistan-U.S. relationship during its 
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formative years. They threw their weight behind the United States because, in their view, the West 
was more advanced in economic and technical fields and had sufficient resources and determination to 
support its allies, which they believed would benefit Pakistan in the long run. 
 
The U.S. tested Pakistan as a frontline ally during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Like 
many Cold War-era partners, Pakistan was able to successfully bargain for significant assistance from 
Washington in exchange for its help in containing the Soviet Union. Neither side was inclined towards 
a deeper alignment of interests in Afghanistan. However, U.S. attention to the Afghan crisis quickly 
evaporated in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from the region, which began a new chapter of resistance 
and confrontation with Islamabad over nuclear proliferation. The U.S. cutoff of aid to Islamabad in the 
waning days of cooperation in Afghanistan led to a view in Pakistan of the U.S. as an ‘unreliable ally’.  
 
In order to reverse the increasing anti-Americanism in Pakistan and the trust deficit on both 
sides, there is a dire need to improve government accountability in Pakistan, which can only be 
reached through education and the improvement of social conditions. It is worth noting that the 
presence of democratic institutions in India (despite their limitations) has also been a factor in that 
country’s stability and, thereby, in attracting investments and partnerships. The United States, 
however, must rely on soft rather than hard power. Its continuous reliance on hard power, its self-
designated status as the sole policeman of international affairs, and its brutal use of force without 
respect for the sovereignty of independent nations can only lead to hostility.  
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